LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE: TRUMP’S TRADE AUTHORITY AND POLICY by Glazier, Noah
South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 14
Issue 1 Fall 2017 Article 7
2017
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMIC
CRITIQUE: TRUMP’S TRADE AUTHORITY
AND POLICY
Noah Glazier
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Journal of
International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glazier, Noah (2017) "LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE: TRUMP’S TRADE AUTHORITY AND




LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE: 
TRUMP S TRADE AUTHORITY AND POLICY  
 
A LOOK AT THE LEGALITY, PRACTICALITY, 
PROBABILITY, AND RATIONALITY OF PRESIDENT 




President Donald Trump made a wide array of comments 
regarding trade during his campaign and time as President.  These 
unconventional to more modest and in-line with past administrations.  
Trump declared most of his more extreme trade-related comments 
during his time on the campaign trail.  For example, Trump claimed 
ate or renegotiate the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA),1 and impose 45 percent and 35 percent tariffs 
on imports from China and Mexico respectively.2  President Trump 
Organization (WTO) altogether.3  However, Trump moved away from 
                                                           
* Mr. Glazier would like to give a special thanks to UC Hastings 
Professor Joel Paul, who provided him with invaluable assistance on this 
article.   He is deeply grateful for Professor 
a teacher and a mentor. 
1 See e.g., Nick Corasaniti, Alexander Burns & Binyamin 
Appelbaum, Donald Trump Vows to Rip Up Trade Deals and Confront China, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-
speech.html?_r=0. 
2 See e.g., Paul Wiseman & Joe McDonald, For Americans, Trump's 
tariffs on imports could be costly, CHI. TRIB. (December 1, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-donald-trump-tariffs-
20161201-story.html. 
3 See e.g., William Mauldin, Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of 
World Trade Organization, WALL ST. J.: WASHINGTON WIRE (June 24, 2016), 
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these more extreme positions since becoming President.  Instead, he 
has taken a slightly more cautious approach, while still reserving the 
aggressively as needed 
practices that harm American citizens.4  
complete with the confirmation of United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) Robert Lighthizer, allowing the Administration to pursue 
believes hurts 
5 
The goal of this paper is to assess the legality, practicality, 
threatened trade measures.  Part II.A of the paper discusses the legal 
trade actions, including his ability to impose tariff and other non-tariff 
barriers to trade, such as quotas on imports from foreign countries.  
This part of the paper will also provide an assessment of the legal 
challenges, practical constraints, and likelihood of each unilateral trade 
measure, including an overview of the following: the relevant 
historical application of certain measures, how other countries or 
aggrieved parties might respond, and what the Trump administration 
city to 
unilaterally withdraw from or terminate NAFTA.  Part III.C critiques 
economic logic.  
                                                           
https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/07/24/trump-threatens-to-pull-u-s-out-
of-world-trade-organization/.  
4 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 




Robert Lighthizer, the United States Trade Representative). 
5 Megan Cassella, -
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
AND ECONOMIC CRITIQUE: TRUMP S TRADE  
AUTHORITY AND POLICY 
 
This section reviews the laws that President Trump may rely on 
to make his threatened unilateral trade actions a reality.  There are over 
nine statutory sections from various trade-related legislations that 
could allow the President, often in conjunction with the USTR and 
other executive agencies, such as the Department of Commerce (DOC) 
and International Trade Commission (ITC), to impose unilateral trade 
measures like duties or quotas on imports from foreign countries.  The 
available U.S. laws are divided into two different groups those that 
are conventional or more commonly used and those used much less 
frequently (if at all) in the past.6  
since taking office, it is more likely that his Administration will utilize 
the more conventional group of unilateral trade mechanisms, although 
he will likely use a more aggressive manner than past administrations.7  
nature, it is also possible that he will utilize some of the more rare 




There are several U.S. trade laws that have been commonly 
utilized by past presidents to help curb unfair foreign trade practices 
and to protect American workers, consumers, and producers.  The 
Trump Administration is already pursuing unilateral trade actions 
under some of these statutory provisions and will likely continue to 
                                                           
6 William Clinton, Scott Lincicome, Brian Picone, Richard Eglin, & 
William Barrett, Implications of the 2016 US Presidential Election for Trade 
Policy, at 6, WHITE & CASE LLP (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/implications-of-the-2016-us-55211/.
7 Id. at 6.  
8 See id. at 2-3. 
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aggressively do so throughout the presidency.9  These commonly-used 
statutory provisions, which primarily involve agency proceedings and 
investigations, are further categorized into three different forms of 
measures: (1) Antidumping (AD) and Countervailing Duty (CVD) 
measures; (2) Section 337 measures; and (3) Section 201 safeguard 
measures.10  These measures have been commonly used by Presidents 
of the past, so their usage will likely cause little legal concern.11  
trade policy and may be used more aggressively than ever before.12  
Thus, review of these measures is due. 
 
a. AD and CVD Measures 
AD (antidumping duties) and CVD (countervailing duties) are 
unilateral trade actions aimed at leveling the international trade 
playing field that are commonly used by Presidential 
administrations.13  AD duties protect against countries that are 
exporting goods at a price that is less than the fair or normal value.14  
CVD provide relief from foreign imports that benefit from government 
                                                           
9 See e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ISSUES AFFIRMATIVE 
PRELIMINARY ANTIDUMPING DUTY DETERMINATIONS ON BIODIESEL FROM 
ARGENTINA AND INDONESIA, Oct. 23, 2017 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/10/us-department-
commerce-issues-affirmative-preliminary-antidumping-duty-1 (for example, 
from January 20, 2017, through October 23, 2017, the Department of 
Commerce initiated 73 antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, 
which represents a 52 percent increase from the previous year.). 
10 See id. at 2; see also U.S. INT L TRADE COMM N, UNDERSTANDING 
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATIONS, 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us_safeguard.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 
2017).  
11 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6. 
12 Id. 
13 Id.; see also U.S. INT L TRADE COMM N, UNDERSTANDING 
ANTIDUMPING & COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATIONS, USITC Pub. 4540 
(June 2015).
14 ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY HANDBOOK, supra note 
13, at 10. 
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subsidies.15  Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is the authority 
implementing such duties.16 
individual 
AD and CVD orders on various products and countries in 2016, many 
of which involved steel imports.17  As of the end of April 2017, the 
Trump Administration imposed 16 individual AD and CVD orders on 
products including artist canvas, large residential washers, off-the-
road tires and stainless steel sheet and strip. 18  For example, the 
Administration implemented AD duties on Japanese steel imports 
ranging from 206.43% to 209.46% and on Turkish steel imports 
ranging from 5.39% to 8.17%.19  Turkish steel imports were also 
subject to CVDs of 16.21%.20  Due to the regularity of such measures, 
it is unlikely that the use of AD and CVD orders by the Trump 
administration will cause any significant legal concerns because the 
law behind the implementation of such unilateral trade measures is 
well established and tested.21  As a result, the mechanics behind 
calculating AD duties and CVDs, which is a very onerous process, are 
only briefly discussed here.  
Two separate government agencies, the DOC and the ITC, are 
involved in setting and administering AD duties and CVDs.22  The 
DOC determines whether dumping or actionable subsidizing exists, 
and if so, determines the respective duties based on the dumping 
margin or amount of subsidy.23  The ITC determines whether such 
dum injure, or threaten with 
                                                           
15 Id. at 11.   
16 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1673i (2012) (on the imposition of 
countervailing duties and antidumping duties).  
17 Adam Behsudi, , POLITICO.COM 
(April 24, 2017), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-
trade/2017/04/eu-trade-chief-comes-calling-219937. 
18 Id. 




21 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
22 Id. at 6.   
23 Id. 
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material . 24  Material injury 
harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant 25 
It should be noted that the Obama administration implemented a 
-market economy 
(NME) status and its state-owned enterprises.26  These changes have 
led to an overall increase in AD duties on Chinese imports, specifically 
where Chinese authorities refused to cooperate with the DOC.27  
-era trade policies, it is likely that 
his Administration will continue pro-duty actions and potentially 
utilize or implement other techniques that would broaden the scope 
and impact of current AD and CVD measures.28  Other techniques 
-
r AD and CVD investigations, and increasing the 
- 29 
When a country has a non-market economy, normal value cannot 
30  Instead, the 
normal value is calculated either by a constructed value of a like 
product based on the cost of factors in a market economy at the same 
level of development or, if such information is not available, by using 
the price of a comparable good exported to the U.S. from another 
market economy at the same level of development.31  This process for 
calculating a non-market economy-  has 
ultimately led to higher AD duties being imposed on imports from 
China.32  China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 
                                                           
24 19 U.S.C. § 1676(a) (1994). 
25 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(a) (2016). 
26 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 6-7. 
30 See Technical Information on anti-dumping, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1), (c)(2) (2016).
32 See Chad P. Brown, Should the United States Recognize China as a 
Market Economy, at 6, PETERSON INST. INT L ECON. (Dec. 2016). 
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and in the process of doing so, it agreed to carry out a series of steps 
designed to open its markets to global trade to act more like a market 
economy.33  In 
including the U.S., would offici
December 11, 2016.34  However, the Trump Administration has made 
recognize the country as a NME because it allows for higher AD 
duties, which in turn ceteris paribus leads to a decrease in Chinese 
account deficit with China.35 
Also with regards to China, it is possible that the Trump 
Administration may direct the DOC to treat deliberate currency 
(undervaluation) manipulation as an actionable export subsidy or as 
grounds to modify the constructed value determination mentioned 
above, which would lead to even higher AD duties.36  However, if this 
approach were implemented unilaterally, it would likely face a 
plethora of legal challenges, both internationally and domestically.37  
Additionally, as discussed in more detail below,38 China is not 
deliberately undervaluing its currency at the moment and Trump, for 
the time being, has completely backed away from his initial threats of 
labeling China as doing such.39 
Another way the Trump administration may attempt to sharpen 
the teeth of the AD and CVD investigation provisions is by utilizing a 
self-initiation process whereby Trump would encourage the DOC to 
instigate such investigations sua sponte.40  Currently, allegedly injured 
domestic partners file petitions at the DOC to initiate AD and CVD 
                                                           
33 Id. at 1. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. (stating that the reduction in AD duties that would result from 
recognizing China as a market economy would likely be a modest increase in 
imports due in part to the CVDs that simultaneously accompany most AD 
duties on Chinese imports). 
36 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7. 
37 Id. 
38 See infra
39 See e.g., Uri Dadush, Will America Trigger a Global Trade War, at 
2, OCP POLICY CTR. (Feb. 2017). 
40 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6. 
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for investigations to be instigated sua sponte, or at the direction of the 
Secretary of Commerce.41  This allows the current Secretary, Wilbur 
Ross, to target specific imports from specific countries and subject 
them to investigations without having to wait for injured parties to file 
petitions.42  Notwithstanding the provision that allows for such self-
process, and doing so will likely be highly controversial.43  In fact, in 
2012, the European Union (EU) attempted to self-initiate AD and 
CVD investigations in a similar fashion against Chinese imports, but 
ultimately decided otherwise in the face of immense domestic and 
international opposition.44 
Lastly, the Trump Administration could take a more aggressive 
approach to existing AD duty and CVD enforcement by relying more 
heavily on the anti-circumvention statute.45  This statute prohibits the 
circumvention of existing AD and CVD orders where there is 
insignificant processing of a good or completion of a good in a third 
country, or where there is further assembly in the U.S.46  A recent case 
involving the anti-circumvention statute was brought near the end of 
argued that China was exporting steel to Vietnam for insignificant 
processing to circumvent AD and CV duties that exist on certain 
Chinese steel imports.47  A final determination on the matter has yet to 
be issued, but within 300 days of publication of the initiation decision, 
the DOC will determine whether China circumvented the existing duty 
orders.48  This time frame may seem long, but it is more expeditious 
                                                           
41 See 19 C.F.R. § 351.201(a) (2005). 
42 Id. 
43 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 7. 
46 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (2016); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 
7. 
47 See e.g., Estelle Tran, US starts China-related anti-circumvention 
probes on Vietnamese steel, S&P GLOBAL (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.platts.com/latest-news/metals/houston/us-starts-china-related-
anti-circumvention-probes-21010438.
48 Estelle Tran, Anti-circumvention probes on Vietnamese steel 
already benefitting US mills, S&P GLOBAL (Nov. 2016), 
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than the typical AD duty investigations, which last anywhere from 
280-420 days.49  Additionally, U.S. steel mills already realized 
benefits since this initiation, as fearful importers faced with long lead 
times continue to cancel orders of the steel from Vietnam currently 
under investigation.50  An affirmative determination of circumvention 
in this case by the DOC will likely signal a more aggressive approach 
to existing AD and CV duty enforcement.51  It is likely that the Trump 
Administration will continue to utilize this anti-circumvention statue, 
perhaps even more aggressively, to ensure that existing AD and CVD 
orders are effectively enforced and not subject to regulatory arbitrage 
by foreign exporters.52 
 
b. Section 337 Measures 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the use of unfair 
competition methods and is arguably the most powerful, cheap, and 
expeditious anti-import tool.53  It allows for the broad remedy of 
excluding imports that benefit from such unfair methods of 
competition.54  Section 337 has three primary uses: to protect 
intellectual property rights, to thwart anti-competitive activities such 
as collusion, price fixing, tying, and other forms of predatory pricing, 
and to promote consumer fraud protection.55  Under Section 337, an 
ITC administrative judge finds a violation has occurred if a foreign 
the 
threat or effect of which is to destroy or 
industry or to restrain or monopolize  trade and commerce.56  
The administrative judge then sends his findings to the ITC, which 




50 Id.  
51 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7. 
52 Id. 
53 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2016); see also lecture notes from Professor 
Joel Paul, UC Hastings (April 2017).
54 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
55 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2016); see also lecture notes, supra note 53. 
56 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2016). 
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takes the findings and makes a recommendation to the President.57  So 
long as the President does not veto the findings and recommendation, 
they will take effect (i.e., no express presidential approval is needed).58  
The average length of all Section 337 investigations completed in 2017 
was just 10.3 months, rendering Section 337 a powerful and 
expeditious tool.59 
However, because of the way this process is designed, President 
Trump has little to no control over the Section 337 process, especially 
in the short term.60  
administrative judges and the agency itself, which is independent and 
bipartisan.61  That being said, Trump is likely to take credit for any 
successful Section 337 actions, such as the potential outcome of a case 
filed in April 2016 by U.S. Steel against almost all Chinese carbon and 
alloy steel products.62  Trump may also attempt to influence the 
Section 337 process in the long-run by appointing sympathetic ITC 
administrative judges and commissioners.63  Additionally, it should be 
noted that if the ITC does indeed find a violation of Section 337 in the 
Chinese carbon and steel alloy products case and imposes the broad 
remedy of excluding such imports, such action will almost certainly be 
met by opposition from China.64  China will likely claim inter alia that 
the action constitutes an impermissible non-tariff barrier to trade in 
violation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 
XI, or that the action otherwise violates the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement.65 
                                                           
57 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(1)(b) (2016). 
58 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(4) (2016). 
59 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, SECTION 337 
STATISTICS: AVERAGE LENGTH OF INVESTIGATIONS, (Oct. 14, 2017), 
https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/337_statistics_average_length_i
nvestigations.htm 
60 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8. 
61 Id. 
62 Certain Carbon and Alloy Steel Products; Institution of 
Investigation, 81 FR 35381 (June 2, 2016); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 8 (for a further discussion of recent section 337 cases and their 
outcomes).
63 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
64 Id. at 6-7. 
65 Id. at 9. 
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c. Section 201 Safeguard Measures 
Another option available to the Trump Administration is to 
actively pursue the safeguard investigation measures permitted under 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.66  While theoretically as potent 
as Section 337 measures, these safeguard measures have rarely 
resulted in any type of enforcement action or effective remedy.67  
Section 201, which is also administered by the ITC, allows for the 
temporary imposition of higher tariffs based on the finding that a surge 
or increase in imports 
68  
However, Section 201 investigations are problematic and difficult, 
69  As such, 
some definitions and explaining are in order.  
The requisite increase in imports must be shown by evidence that 
net imports have increased by at least a certain nominal amount or that 
they have increased by a certain threshold percentage relative to 
domestic production.70  
and not less important than any other cause.71  This is a problematic 
standard similar to the Tellabs pleading standard whereby, e.g., a cause 
contributing to 33% of the injury along with two other causes each 
72  As it is 
difficult to compare different inferences of scienter in the Tellabs 
context,73 it is also very difficult to compare different causes of 
domestic producer injury, particularly because economic causes and 
factors are often inexorably intertwined and cannot be disaggregated.74  
                                                           
66 Id. at 8.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 8. 
69 Id. 
70 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(C) (2016). 
71 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2016). 
72 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 
(2007). 
73 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
standard and the difficulties of making determinations re inferences of 
scienter).  
74 See lecture notes, supra note 53.  
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that must be proven in AD and CVD cases.75 
Additionally, Section 201 safeguard measures are subject to 
significant limitations.76  Unlike the AD and CVD orders or Section 
337 violation remedies, the Section 201 safeguard measures apply to 
all imports from all countries.77  Thus, the safeguard measures could 
not be used to target individual products (e.g. steel) or countries (e.g. 
China) and may therefore be seen as less desirable to Trump, who is 
primarily considered with bilateral merchandise account deficits.78  
Furthermore, as is the case with Section 337 investigations, Section 
201 safeguard measures are implemented and administered by the ITC, 
influence the safeguard process especially in the short-term.79 
Most Section 201 cases are filed in election years because, in 
many ways, Section 201 is ultimately a political tool that allows the 
U.S. government to escape the political pressures imposed by 
industries seeking protection from a surge of imports.80  For example, 
the petition filed by the U.S. steel industry in the important election 
year of 2000 was the last Section 201 safeguard imposed on steel.81  
imposed in 2002.82  However, this tariff was promptly terminated in 
U.S. failed to show that the Section 201 safeguard measures had 
83 
This serves as a salient indication that any usage of Section 201 
by the Trump Administration will likely be met by immediate WTO 
                                                           
75 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 See id.   
79 Id. 
80 See lecture notes from Professor Joel Paul, UC Hastings (April 
2017). 
81 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8.
82 Kevin K. Ho, Trading Rights and Wrongs: The 2002 Bush Steel 
Tariffs, 21 BERKELEY J. OF INT'L LAW 825, 832 (2003).  
83 Id. at 839. 
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challenges from other countries.84  In order to survive such challenges, 
as a result of unforeseen 
developments, as to cause 




In contrast to the more commonly-used statutory provisions 
mentioned above, other less used U.S. laws potentially allow Trump 
to take broad (and sometimes virtually unfettered) unilateral trade 
action against foreign imports.86  However, because they are 
infrequency used, these statutory provisions will likely cause a wide 
range of both legal and economic concerns and will be faced with stark 
opposition from foreign countries and U.S. industry groups alike.87  
Additionally, to achieve his trade goals using these statutes, the Trump 
88  
As a result, it is more likely that the Trump administration will opt to 
utilize the aforementioned more common and conventional statutes.89 
That being said, the more infrequently-used statutes enumerated 
below arguably have a higher chance of being utilized under Trump 
than under any president before, which is exemplified in part by 
 separate Section 232 investigations 
                                                           
84 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Experts Warn of Backlash in Donald 
, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-policy-
china.html; see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 8. 
85 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1957, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, at 36 [hereinafter GATT].  
86 See Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral 
Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. 
INT L ECON. L. 233, 247-48 (1996) (discussing the impact section 301 has on 
the President).
87 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
88 See id.  
89 Id. 
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in his first one-hundred days as President.90  The less commonly-used 
statutory provisions permitting unilateral trade actions discussed 
below include: (1) Section 232 national security measures; (2) Section 
122 balance-of-payments measures; (3) Section 338 measures; (4) 
Section 301 measures; and (5) Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) 
and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (EIIPA) 
measures.91  This section concludes with a brief discussion of the 
relative likelihoods of each of these measures. 
 
 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes 
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross to investigate whether certain 
classes of imports pose a national security threat to the U.S.92  In 
determining a national security threat, the Secretary and the President 
domestic production needed for projected national 
defense requirements importation of goods in terms of their 
quantities and use 93  They must also recognize the close relation 
between national economic welfare and national security, and consider 
impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of 
individual domestic industries 94  The DOC is required to instigate 
Section 23 pon request of the head of any 
department or agency, upon application of an interested party , or sua 
                                                           
90 OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC Y, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE 
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE: ALUMINUM IMPORTS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/04/27/presidential-memorandum-secretary-commerce; OFFICE OF 
THE PRESS SEC Y, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF 
COMMERCE: STEEL IMPORTS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY (Apr. 20, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/20/presidential-
memorandum-secretary-commerce; see infra 
 
91 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9-13. 
92 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (2012); id. at 10. 
93 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (2012).      
94 Id.; see also DEP T OF COM., FACT SHEET: SECTION 232 
INVESTIGATIONS: THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY (2017),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2017/04/fact-sheet-section-
232-investigations-effect-imports-national-security [hereinafter Section 232 
Fact Sheet]. 
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sponte.95  Based on a Section 232 report from Secretary Ross, which 
is prepared within 270 days of initiation, Trump is then authorized to 
actions as the President deems necessary to adjust the 
imports so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national 
96  Thus, Section 232 provides President Trump with a tool 
that is potentially very powerful, as the statute provides no limit on the 
amount of tariffs or nature of restrictions.97 
However, utilization of Section 232 in the past has been somewhat 
rare, especially since the U.S. joined the WTO in 1995.98  Since 1980, 
the DOC has conducted 14 Section 232 investigations, but none of 
them resulted in the imposition of significant tariffs or other non-tariff 
barriers to trade.99  Since 1995, only two Section 232 probes, one on 
steel in 2001 and one on crude oil in 1999, resulted in DOC reports 
declining to recommend that the president take action.100 However, 
two notable 1970s Section 232 actions are worth mentioning those 
of Presidents Nixon and Ford.  Nixon used his authority under Section 
232(b) to impose an across-the-board 10 percent surcharge tariff 
program in 1971.101  Ford, pursuant to his Section 232(b) powers, 
issued a proclamation in 1975 raising licensing fees on petroleum 
products and imposing $1-$3/barrel fees on oil entering the U.S.102  
                                                           
95 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
96 Id. at (3)(A)(ii)(II). 
97 Id.; see CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 10; see also Noland et al., 
Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign, PETERSON 
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, Sept. 2016, at 9. 
98 See A National Security Argument on Trade, STRATFOR ENT., 
LLC (Apr. 21, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.stratfor.com/node/279276 
has cond  
99 See Bureau of Indus. and Sec., Section 232 Investigations: The 
Effect of Imports on the National Security (2016), 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/232; Section 232 Fact Sheet supra note 94. 
100 See 
Imports of Iron Ore and Semi-Finished Steel on the National Security (2001); 
rt Admin., The Effect on the National 
Security of Imports of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products (1999).
101 Noland et al., supra note 97, at 9-10; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra
note 6, at 10. 
102 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 10. 
 
             SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
42              INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS VOL. 14.2 
 
 ability to set minimum prices for crude oil absent 
congressional approval.103 
So far in his time as President, Trump has directed Secretary Ross 
to begin two separate Section 232 investigations one on steel imports 
and one on aluminum imports, both were initiated in April 2017.104  
105  
According to Chad Brown, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute, 
hen you go down this path of reverting to the national security 
exception, it really is 106  
decisions to instigate these probes were made about a week apart in 
late April, just as he was approaching the 100-day mark of his 
presidency, perhaps as the result of political and internal pressure to 
live-up to some of his campaign promises to get tough on trade.107  
 not be completed until early 
2018 based on the 270 day timeline, so any Section 232(b) action by 
President Trump will not occur until that time.108 
practical and legal constraints, especially if they result in the 
imposition of tariffs or other non-tariff barriers.109  The biggest 
                                                           
103 See Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 94-
99, 89 Stat. 481(1975); id. 
104 See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC Y, supra note 90; see e.g., Doug 
Palmer & Matthew Nussbaum, 
, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2017, 9:25 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/26/trump-aluminum-imports-trade-
237665. 
105 See Doug Palmer, Matthew Nussbaum, supra note 104.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Section 232 Fact Sheet supra note 94; see also, Ana Swanson, Will 
2018 Be the Year of Protectionism? Trump Alone Will Decide, New York 
Times (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/ 
us/politics/2018-trump-protectionism-tariffs.html (as of January 6, 2018, the 
reports have not been filed, but the deadlines are soon approaching; the 
Commerce Department must submit its reports on January 15, 2018 and 
January 21, 2018 for the steel and aluminum investigations, respectively).  
109 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. 
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practical constraint, as alluded to above, is the risk that such measures 
will result in retaliatory actions from other countries.110  This risk is 
especially salient with regard to China, who has demonstrated both the 
willingness and ability to effectively retaliate in the past (e.g., in 
111  The 
perverse economic repercussions that may result serve as significant 
practical limitations to such action, and will likely deter a mindful 
Trump Administration from engaging in overly aggressive unilateral 
Section 232 actions.112 
face challenges, both in U.S. courts and at the WTO.113  
Notwithstanding the fact that U.S. courts strongly defer to the 
exe
how such domestic cases may play out in the Section 232 context.114  
For example, aggrieved parties bringing claims in U.S. courts might 
ion 232(b) to 
impose import restrictions violates the separation of powers principle 
and, more specifically, the non-delegation doctrine.115  While the non-
delegation doctrine has not been explicitly applied by the Supreme 
Court since 1935, it is still good law.116  In essence, the doctrine states 
that whenever Congress delegates authority to the executive branch, 
such delegation is only permissible when Congress provides an 
accompanying intelligible principle to guide the executive branch on 
how to exercise such authority.117  Thus, it could be argued that 
Section 232 gives the President unfettered discretion and fails to 
                                                           
110 Id. at 9.  
111 Id. at 11. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 10. 
115 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
537 (1935); also see Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935). 
116 See A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495, 537; also see, 
Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. 388, 420-21.
117 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., at 530; Panama Refining Co., at 
429-30. 
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provide the requisite intelligible principle; therefore, it 
unconstitutionally undermines the non-delegation doctrine.118 
Additionally, foreign countries targeted by any Section 232(b) 
actions will almost certainly file complaints with the WTO pursuant to 
GATT Article XXIII, claiming that their legitimate expectations of 
trade benefits have been nullified or impaired by the Section 232(b) 
action.119  However, the U.S. could cite to the national security 
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interest taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
120  In turn, foreign countries would likely argue that the 
national security exception does not apply in this context, as there is 
stake.121  Taking aluminum as an example, such countries might argue 
that U.S. national security requirements for aluminum (i.e., the 
amounts of aluminum required by national defense and homeland 
security) are entirely supplied by U.S. domestic production, and 
therefore, imported aluminum simply does not impair U.S. national 
security.122 
They may also argue that international trade in aluminum products 
strengthens, rather than impairs, the U.S. economy; citing the fact that 
-
                                                           
118 See Tim Meyer, 
hurdle: The US Constitution, The Conversation (Aug. 15, 2017), 
http://theconversation.com/trumps-threat-to-withdraw-from-nafta-may-hit-a-
hurdle-the-us-constitution-81444 
119 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 10. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
122 See e.g., 
Republic of China, U.S. Department of Commerce Section 232 Investigation 
on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on U.S. National Security (June 22, 
2017) (according to this testimony, the amount of aluminum required by 
national defense is small, accounting for only 1.7 percent of the U.S. total 
domestic consumption of aluminum and less than 4 percent of the U.S. total 
domestic supply of aluminum). 
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in 2016 
123 
XXI national security exception, in this context, will likely face 
opposition from the WTO itself.124  Allowing this exception would 
-for-
process.125  That being said, the Trump administration emphasized that 
the U.S. would make its decision concerning the Section 232 




Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to 
-of-  
by imposing temporary import surcharges, quotas, or both.127  Such 
import surcharges cannot exceed fifteen percent, in proportion to the 
estimated value of the goods concerned.128  The surcharge and quota 
restrictions are limited to last 150 days, absent a congressionally 
approved extension.129  Pursuant to Section 122, the temporary quota 
restriction can only be exercised 
agreements to which the United States is a party permit the imposition 
of quotas as a balance-of-  only to the extent 
                                                           
123 Id. 
124 See CLINTON, ET AL., supra note 6, at 11. 
125 Id. 
126 See Palmer and Nussbaum, supra note 104, (quoting Secretary Ross, 
our view as to who's violating those rules  and the WTO will do what they 
127 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. Ch. 12 § 12, § 2101, et seq.
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
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the temporary fifteen percent surcharge, in proportion to the estimated 
value of the goods concerned.130 
Section 122 allows the President to impose such temporary 
restrictions on a non-discriminatory basis 
131  
Otherwise, the statute permits the President to specifically target 
countries which the U.S. has a large trade deficit with.132  Given 
focus on bilateral merchandise trade deficits, if he were to utilize 
Section 122, President Trump would likely opt for the latter option and 
target China, Germany, Mexico, and Japan specifically because these 
countries run the largest bilateral surpluses with the U.S. and are, 
therefore, his largest concerns.133  While President Trump could take 
action pursuant to Section 122, absent a finding of a threat to national 
security, the duration and size of the restrictions would be severely 
limited by the statutory constraints.  
Additionally, as is this case with the less-commonly used statutory 
measures discussed herein, Section 122 actions would likely spur legal 
challenges in both the U.S. courts and in a WTO tribunal.  Reading the 
face of the statute and relying on its plain meaning, potential plaintiffs 
could argue that it would be impossible for the U.S. 
and serious balance-of-
exchange rate regime since current account deficits are offset by 
capital account surpluses.134  In turn, the U.S. would likely cite the 
historical origins of Section 122 -of-
account deficits.135  Additionally, the U.S. would likely argue that the 
of Section 122, which is not what Congress intended. 
Section 122 actions would also likely encounter challenges from 
the WTO.  Any use of Section 122, to specifically target countries 
                                                           
130 Id. at § 201(a)(3)(C). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at § 201(d). 
133 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.
134 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11; see also, CLINTON ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 11.  
135 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11. 
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which the U.S. has a large trade deficit with, would almost certainly 
violate GATT - 136  As a 
result, targeted countries would likely file GATT Article XXIII 
dispute settlement process would take longer than the 150-day 
restriction.137  As a potential defense to a WTO challenge, the Trump 
administration may cite GATT Article XII, which, under certain 
circumstances, permits contracting parties to restrict imports in order 
to safeguard their balance-of-payments.138  However, the U.S. can only 
properly utilize this defense if the IMF finds that it is experiencing 
sufficient balance-of-payment difficulties, but countries are rarely 
found to experience these difficulties.139 
 
 
- 140 Section 338 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930 provides the President with broad tariff-setting authority 
fifty percent, in proportion to the estimated value of the goods 
concerned, on imports 
against U.S. commerce.141  Section 338 authority is triggered when 
enforced upo
                                                           
136 GATT art.1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5) and (6), 55 U.N.T.S. 196. 
137 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11; see also, CLINTON ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 11. 
138 GATT art.7, supra note 85, at 12. 
139 GATT art. 15, supra note 85, at 24-25; see also, Chapter 3 
Quantitative Restrictions, MINISTRY FOR ECON., TRADE AND 
INDUS.,http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/gCT0003e.pdf. 
140 See John Veroneau and Catherine Gibson, -




141 The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1930). 
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142 Section 338 also allows the President to 
completely block certain imports from countries that continue to 
 in 
proportion to the estimated value of the goods concerned.143  Section 
338 investigations may be instigated as deemed necessary or via 
private party petitions to the ITC.144 
Despite the theoretically immense tariff authority that Section 338 
provides the President, its lack of use, coupled with substantial 
pragmatic and legal constraints, render it unlikely to be used as a tool 
for trade. Section 338 has never been used to impose duties on foreign 
imports.  In fact, no public record relating to Section 338 was 
uncovered since a telegram from then-Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson mentioned it in 1949.145  As a result, there are currently no 
regulations regarding Section 338 presidential proclamations.146  The 
of the Trade Act of 1974.147  Even if President Trump utilized Section 
338, despite the fact that it is functionally defunct and forgotten, such 
use would likely be met with immense pushback in American courts.  
Injured parties would likely, among other things, make non-delegation 
doctrinal arguments such as those discussed in the Section 232 context 
above.148  The injured parties may also argue that the Uruguay Rounds 
Agreements Act, which formally adopts the GATT, supersedes 
Section 1338 and, therefore, renders it void.149 
150  As mentioned above, Section 1338 
requires a finding of intercountry trade-related discrimination that 
                                                           
142 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1930); see also, Veroneau and Gibson, supra 
note 140, at 1; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9. 
143 19 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1930). 
144 See Veroneau and Gibson, supra note 140, at 1. 
145 Id. at 2. 
146 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9. 
147 Id.
148 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
149 See Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1143.  
150 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 9. 
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results in an impact disparately effecting the U.S.151  GATT Article I 
obliges countries to treat each other on an MFN basis.152  Therefore, 
trade-related discrimination is difficult to prove whenever the target 
country is a WTO member.153  In fact, the principal idea and goal 
behind the GATT is twofold; countries both promote non-
discrimination and facilitate comparative advantage by preventing 
154  Thus, it 
seems that GATT currently serves the primary purpose of this 
antiquated statutory provisio  to thwart discriminatory foreign trade 
practices (and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, discussed in the 
sub-section below).  
Another limitation of the statute stems from the fact that Section 
1338 authorizes the ITC, and not the President or any other agency, to 
 occurred.155  
Therefore, any unilateral actions by the President would arguably only 
be permissible only after such a determination by the ITC (which is an 
independent and bipartisan agency).  Section 1338 is, in a way, 
similarly limited to the Sections 1337 and 2132 measures, as discussed 
earlier, which are also subject to ITC involvement.156  Finally, any 
Section 1338 actions will be met by immediate WTO challenges. 
Targeted countries could claim, among other things, that the U.S. 
violated GATT Article II by failing to bind itself to its tariff 
concessions.157  This Article II argument is available to targeted 
countries anytime the U.S. unilaterally raises tariffs.158  Absent some 
permissible exception, a WTO panel will likely hold adversely to the 
U.S.
 
                                                           
151 See 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(2). 
152 GATT art. 1, supra note 85. 
153 See Clinton et al., supra note 6, at 9. 
154 See generally GATT art. 1, supra note 85 (explaining that the treaty 
seeks mutually advantageous agreements, which reduce barriers to trade).  
155 19 U.S.C. § 1338(g); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 10. 
156 19 U.S.C. § 1338 (2016).
157 See GATT, art. 2, supra note 85. 
158 Id. 
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the United States 
Trade Representative (hereinafter USTR), at the direction of the 
President, to respond to unfair trade practices by taking a wide variety 
of retaliatory actions, including increasing tariffs or other import 
restrictions.159  -commonly 
cited statutes, the Trump administration referenced the statute in the 
2017 National Trade Policy Agenda.160  Section 301(2411) prescribes 
both mandatory and discretionary USTR action.161  Section 301(a) 
 which the USTR must take when a state 
violates a U.S. trade agreement.162  Conversely, Section 301(b) 
 which the USTR may take if it is 
 U.S. commerce.163 
broadly.164  State actions can be 
nt with, the international 
165  
den[y] national or most-favored-nation treatment to United States 
goods, services, or inves 166  If the USTR finds such 
conduct.167  Thus, Section 301 gives the President, through the USTR, 
broad authority to retaliate against unfair foreign trade practices (e.g., 
market access restrictions or other U.S. export obstacles) by imposing 
                                                           
159 19 U.S.C. § 301 (2016); 19 U.S.C. §§2411-2420 (2016). 
160 See supra note 4, at 3-
4.  
161 19 U.S.C. § 301 (2016). 
162 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2016). 
163 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (2016). 
164 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2016).
165 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A) (2016).
166 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(5) (2016). 
167 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (2016). 
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a wide range of retaliatory actions, including tariff increases or 
quotas.168 
The retaliatory actions, that Section 301(c) authorizes, include the 
ability to: withdraw or suspend the benefits of certain trade agreement 
concessions; impose duties or other import restrictions for as long as 
the USTR determines appropriate; withdraw, limit, or suspend 
preferential duty treatment; and enter into binding agreements that 
obligate offending foreign countries to eliminate or phase out their 
unfair foreign trade practices.169  These authorized actions may be 
taken on either a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against targeted 
foreign countries based on their unfair practices.170  Section 301 
investigations may by instigated by the USTR in response to private 
r 
 by its own 
volition.171  As a result, Section 301 has historically served as an 
effective way for private parties, who have no right of action under the 
etition the U.S. 
government to take action. These petitions have resulted in WTO 
hearings instead of per se retaliation.172 
While Section 301 potentially provides the USTR and the 
President with broad authority to respond to unfair trade practices, its 
historical usage and success rate suggest that the tool may be less 
powerful than it seems.173 Historically, the U.S. has been more 
successful using multilateral means to get trade concessions than using 
Section 301 as a retaliatory tool.174  Based on a study comparing a total 
of 189 trade actions between 1975 and 2000, the U.S. was thirty-four 
                                                           
168 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420; see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 
12. 
169 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c). 
170 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(3)(A).  
171 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 12. 
172 See lecture notes, supra note 53 (noting that the establishment of the 
WTO, Section 301 has not produced any unilateral sanctions). 
173 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a). 
174 See 
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percent less likely to secure targeted country concessions when it 
utilized the unilateral Section 301 route over multilateral channels.175  
This is primarily because targeted countries, particularly Japan, 
viewed resisting unilateralism as beneficial in the long-run.176  Japan, 
and other countries, feared that conceding to such retaliation would 
incentivize the U.S., and perhaps other well-established, developed 
nations, to impose similar threats and unilateral coercion in the 
future.177  On the other hand, when countries concede to legitimate 
concessions through the same legitimate multilateral means in the 
future.178  Thus, Section 301, despite providing a facially potent threat 
of retaliation, may prove to be less effective than it seems.  
 make 
its utilization less likely and effective, even if it were utilized.  The 
U.S. agreed, in the Statement of Administrative Action accompanying 
the Uruguay Agreements Act, not to unilaterally invoke Section 301 
prior to an affirmative WTO determination.179 Therefore, the U.S. is 
precluded from imposing Section 301 actions without first filing a 
complaint with the WTO and receiving a favorable, merit-based 
determination time-
consuming process.  However, such a restriction only covers Section 
301 actions taken in connection with claims covered by existing WTO 
agreements, and as a result the USTR could initiate Section 301 against 
WTO agreements.180  Th  is rather weak 
                                                           
175 See Krzysztof J. Pelc, Constraining Coercion? Legitimacy and Its 




176 See generally, id.  
177 Id. 
178 Id.  
179 H.R. 5110, 103rd Cong. (1994); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 
6, at 13; Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11.
180 H.R. 5110, 103rd Cong. (1994); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 
6, at 13. 
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in practice as the USTR has been disinclined to challenge any such 
practices that are not covered by WTO agreements.181 
If President Trump and USTR Lighthizer were to unilaterally 
impose Section 301 actions, either by alleging that the targeted 
discriminatory practice was outside WTO agreements or by ignoring 
the WTO entirely, such actions would be subject to immediate legal 
challenge.182  For example, as discussed above vis- à-vis some of the 
aforementioned statutory provisions, targeted countries would bring 
GATT Article XXIII nullification and impairment claims to the 
WTO.183  In a 1999 case, the EU filed a WTO complaint against the 
U.S. for its use of Section 301.  The WTO determined that the U.S. 
had violated its WTO commitments by failing to pursue WTO actions 
instead of engaging in Section 301 unilateralism.184  This case serves 
as important precedent and foreshadows the fact that the Trump 
administration will likely lose any WTO challenges to its unilateral use 
of Section 301, especially if the targeted action is covered by WTO 
agreements (which it almost certainly would be, given the breadth of 
185
Aside from these legal hurdles and procedural limitations, a 
salient practical constraint on Section 301 is the risk of retaliatory 
action by targeted countries in lieu of legal challenges, and the 
deleterious economic consequences that would ensue.  Section 301 
actions may indeed spur a tit-for-tat retaliatory trade war as seen in the 
1930s,186 as targeted countries decide to unilaterally retaliate back 
against the U.S. using the same arguments the Trump administration 
had offered toward WTO applicability.187  This could potentially 
stimulate a dangerous self-perpetuating cycle that could plausibly 
                                                           
181 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 13. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See DS 152, United States  Sections 301 310 of the Trade Act 
1974, WTO (1999), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds152_e.htm; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 13. 
185 Id.  
186See e.g., Enda Curran, Trump Rhetoric Raises Specter of 1930s-Style 
Trade War, BLOOMBERG (January 6, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-06/trump-rhetoric-raises-
specter-of-1930s-style-trade-war-with-asia. 
187 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 13. 
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cripple the global economy.188  While the Trump administration 
purportedly remains indifferent to adverse WTO rulings, it is certainly 
sensitive to retaliation, especially targeted at politically important 
goods such as Florida oranges.189 
 
5. TWEA AND IEEPA MEASURES190 
The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), enacted as the 
U.S. was entering World War I, delegates expansive authority to the 
President, allowing him to freeze and seize foreign assets, and 
e during times of war.191  
192  While President Roosevelt 
was able to successfully invoke Section 5(b) of the TWEA during the 
heart of the Great Depression to declare a national emergency and 
order a bank holiday,193 the scope of the statute has since been more 
limited by Congress.  In 1976, Congress amended the TWEA to limit 
its application more directly to times of war.194  Another significant 
constraint is that the TWEA does not specifically authorize the 
President to increase tariffs. Instead, it vaguely permits him to 
195  Thus, invoking the TWEA to 
increase tariffs would generate a plethora of legal challenges.196  These 
challenges would 
context and in part on an interpretation of whether Congress intended 
the TWEA to be used only during times of congressionally declared 
                                                           
188 See e.g., Curran, supra note 186. 
189 Id. 
190 For a compressive review of both measures, see Chapter 5: 
Authorities Relating to Political or Economic Security; Committee on Ways 
and Means (2010 Edition), 251-266, available at: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111WPRT63130/pdf/CPRT-
111WPRT63130.pdf. 
191 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 §§ 5(a)-(b), as amend. (1976); 
see also, Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11-13; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 14.  
192 Chapter 5, supra note 190, at 251. 
193 See Noland et al., supra note 97, at 12. 
194 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
195 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 § 5(b), as amend, (1976). 
196 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14. 
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war (as opposed to unauthorized military action, e.g., the ongoing 
197 
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 
(IEEPA), which further limits the applicability of the TWEA, similarly 
authorizes the President to freeze and seize foreign assets and 
198  However, unlike the TWEA, 
 
199  Importantly, President Trump may only invoke 
his IEEPA authority if a national emergency has been declared under 
the National Emergencies Act.200  Therefore, in the IEEPA context, 
President Trump could not declare an actionable national emergency 
sua sponte, which imposes a significant constraint on its usage.  
Additionally, while the IEEPA does not require consent from 
Congress, the act mandates that the President consult with Congress 
and provide periodic reports explaining and justifying his actions.201  
As a result, if President Trump invokes his IEEPA powers to engage 
in actions adverse to politically important constituents, Congress will 
likely attempt to pass limiting legislation, which would require two-
 
Never
extensive.  Historically, the IEEPA has been invoked by Presidents to 
impose other export controls such as sanctions and embargoes.202  
Since its inception, it has been utilized by past Presidents as a powerful 
tool at least sixteen times.203  For example, during the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis, President Carter called upon his IEEPA powers in Executive 
Order 12170 to freeze about $8 billion of Iranian government assets 
                                                           
197 Id. 
198 The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977; see 
also, Noland et al., supra note 97, at 11-13; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra 
note 6, at 14.  
199 Id.  
200 See Chapter 5, supra note 190, at 251. 
201 Id. at 252.
202 Id. at 252-63.  
203 Id.  
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held in the U.S.204  The IEEPA was also used in 1985 by President 
Reagan to block all exports and imports to and from Nicaragua in 
205  In 1997, 
President Clinton used his IEEPA authority to block Sudan 
government property and prohibit certain transactions due in part to 
206  Importantly, the 
106 of the USA Patriot Act, which permits the blocking of assets 
207  That being said, IEEPA 
has never been used specifically to combat trade deficits.208 
Given its scope, applicability, and historical usage, President 
Trump could likely use the IEEPA provisions to prohibit trade with 
foreign nations actively involved in terrorism.209  In fact, Presidents 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama all used the IEEPA for that very purpose.210  
imports from China or Mexico on economic grounds, for example, 
would require a very liberal interpretation of the statute.211  
Additionally, use of either the TWEA or IEEPA will probably be met 
by legal challenges filed at the WTO by targeted countries.212  Because 
these statutory provisions involve national security concerns, the U.S. 
would likely cite the GATT Article XXI national security exception in 
response to any nullification and impairment WTO challenges à la 
Section 232.213  However, depending on the circumstances of the 
national emergency, the WTO may be reluctant to recognize such an 
exception in this context due to the same institutional concerns 
discussed vis-à-vis Section 232 above.214 Furthermore, as is this case 
with utilization of any of the aforementioned unilateral trade action 
                                                           
204 Id. at 254. 
205 Id. at 255-56.  
206 Id. at 261. 
207 Id. at 251-52.  
208 Id.  
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 241, 254. 
211 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14. 
212 See id. at 14.
213 See id.
214 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 232; 
see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14. 
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vehicles, the risk of retaliation and subsequent consequences serves as 
a significant practical constraint on such measures.215 
 
 
Given the legal and practical constraints and framework analysis 
discussed above, the aforementioned less commonly used statutory 
provisions have the following relative likelihood of use by the Trump 
administration:   IEEPA > Section 122 > 
TWEA > Section 338.216  As previously discussed, the Trump 
administration has already initiated two Section 232 probes, one on 
steel and one on aluminum.217  Additionally, after explicitly 
referencing Section 301
Agenda, which refers to powerful lever to encourage 
foreign countries to adopt more market-friendly policies 218 the 
Trump administration officially instigated a Section 301 investigation 
of China in August 2017.219  President Trump or his administration 




In addition to threatening other countries with duties and other 
import restrictions, Trump has repeatedly claimed, including in his 
Contract with the American Voter Treasury 
Secretary to lab
Trump would impose appropriate countervailing duties to combat such 
                                                           
215 See CLINTON, ET. AL, supra note 6, at 14. 
216 With Section 232 being the most likely and Section 338 the least 
likely. 
217 See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 232. 
218 THE PRESIDENT S 2017 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 4, at 4. 
219 See Robert Lighthizer, USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 
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practice.220  Since his time as President, Trump has completely 
reversed himself on this position.221  
currency manipulation criteria and reporting processes are discussed 
below.  These criteria and report determination mechanisms remain 
propensity to flip-flop 
on important issues.222 
 
 
Two different U.S. laws, Section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988,223 and Section 701 of the Trade 
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015,224 direct Secretary of 
the Treasury Steven Mnuchin to periodically analyze the 
macroeconomic and exchange rate polices of major U.S. trading 
partners.  Section 3004 mandates annual reporting, and Section 701 
mandates biannual reporting.225  The goal of the reports is to determine 
purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or 
226 
Section 701 provides Secretary Mnuchin with three criterion for 
identifying currency manipulation by considering whether countries 
have:  (1) a bilateral merchandise trade surplus with the U.S. exceeding 
                                                           
220 Contract with the American Voter
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/CONTRACT_FOR_THE_VOTER.pdf; see, 
e.g., Corasaniti, et. al., supra note 1; see also, CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 
administration the US Treasury Department will designate China as a currency 
es appropriate 
 
221See, e.g., Matthew Nussbaum, Trump shifting positions at breakneck 
pace, POLITICO, Apr. 12, 2017, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/donald-trump-shifts-positions-nato-
health-care-china-237175. 
222 See, e.g., id. 
223 22 U.S.C. § 5305 (2016).
224 19 U.S.C. § 4421 (Supp. 2017).
225 22 U.S.C. § 5305(a); 19 U.S.C. § 4421(a)(1) (2016). 
226 22 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2016). 
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ematically intervened to depress their currencies.227  
While China, running by far the greatest merchandise trade surplus 
with the U.S. of approximately $356 billion in 2015, certainly satisfies 
the first criterion, it fails to satisfy the other two criterion.228  
net current account surplus is approximately in excess of only 2.4% of 
229  
Additionally, regarding the third criterion, China is not systemically 
intervening to depress its currency at the moment.230  In fact, China 
recently has been selling U.S. treasury bonds at a record pace in an 
231  Currently, just two countries, 
Taiwan and Switzerland, are actively intervening to depress their 
currencies; however, they both fail to meet the $20 billion bilateral 
goods deficit benchmark.232
Even if China were to satisfy the three criteria or Secretary 
Mnuchin otherwise labeled the country a currency manipulator, 
neither Section 3004 nor Section 701 authorize President Trump to 
impose countervailing duties, or any other import restrictions, as a 
response.233  Instead, Section 701 merely directs President Trump, 
urge implementation 
of policies to address the causes of the undervaluation of its 
currency 234  Under Section 701(c)(1), the President is entitled to 
engage in limited forms of remedial action if such offending countries 
fail to adopt appropriate corrective policies within one year of the 
                                                           
227 Dadush, supra note 39, at 2; see also 19 U.S.C. § 
4421(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I-III) (2016). 
228 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.  
229 Id.  
230 See generally, id. 
of currency manipulation). 
231 See, e.g., Evelyn Cheng, China is working hard to support its 
currency  it sold US government bonds for six straight months, CNBC (Jan. 
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/19/china-is-working-hard-to-support-
its-currency--it-sold-us-government-bonds-for-six-straight-months.html. 
232 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2.
233 See 22 U.S.C. § 5304(b) (2016); see also 19 U.S.C. § 4421(c)(1)(A)-
(D) (2016); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 6, at 14. 
234 19 U.S.C. § 4421(b)(1) (2016). 
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commencement of the bilateral engagements.235  However, none of 
these remedial actions permit President Trump to increase tariffs or 
impose any other non-tariff barriers to trade.236  As a result, even if the 
Trump Administration were to label China a currency manipulator, it 
would not be able to increase duties or otherwise restrict Chinese 
imports as a response.237  To do so, President Trump would have to 




President Trump has repeatedly publicly censured NAFTA 
calling it the  and 
239  Notwithstanding his purported dislike 
for the free trade agreement, President Trump has since announced that 
he will not be terminating the agreement but instead renegotiating it.240  
The Trump Administration formally began this renegotiation process 
on May 18, 2017, when it sent a letter to Congress stating its intentions 
to do so.241  Despite this formal indication of intent to renegotiate, the 
discussion here focuses on whether President Trump has the authority 
to unilaterally withdraw from or terminate NAFTA.242 
                                                           
235 19 U.S.C. § 4421(c)(1) (2016). 
236 For a list of permissible remedial actions under this section, see 19 
U.S.C. §§ 4421(c)(1)(A)-(D) (2016). 
237 See id. 
238 See Trade Act of 1974 § 201. 
239 For a list of all the negative statements Trump has said about 
NAFTA, see generally Here are all the terrible things 
President Trump has said about NAFTA  before deciding to stick with it
NY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/terrible-president-trump-nafta-
article-1.3107104. 




242 For a compressive discussion of the NAFTA termination process, 
see Jon R. Johnson, The Art of Breaking the Deal: What President Trump Can 
, C. D. Howe Institute (Jan. 2017), 
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a. Terminating NAFTA 
to unilaterally terminate NAFTA is briefly reviewed first.  NAFTA 
Article 2205 provides that a Party (i.e. the U.S., Canada, or Mexico) 
may withdraw from the agreement six months after providing 
sufficient notice.243  However, merely giving such notice does not give 
effect to such a withdrawal.  Instead, such a withdrawal can be 
Congress have joint authority 244 
U.S. trade agreements such as NAFTA are:  (1) negotiated by the 
USTR, (2) signed and approved by the President through his foreign 
affairs power, and importantly (3) approved and implemented by 
Congress through congressionally enacted legislation.245
involvement is constitutionally imperative, since trade agreements like 
NAFTA directly affect U.S. commerce, the regulation of which is 
246  
Thus, withdrawal from NAFTA can only have effect if Congress 
contemporaneously repeals its implementing legislation, which is 
codified in the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act.247  Therefore, President Trump could not unilaterally withdraw 
from NAFTA. 
Some legal experts have argued that President Trump has the 
authority to unilaterally withdraw from NAFTA pursuant to the 
Trade Act of 1974.248  However, this argument is misguided and 
                                                           
https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mix
ed/Commentary_464.pdf. 
243 See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2205, Dec. 6, 1983. 
244 Johnson, supra note 242, at 1.  
245 See id. at 4. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 See, e.g., Warren H. Maruyama & Robert D. Kyle, President Trump 
Will Have Broad Presidential Authority to Terminate Trade Agreements and 
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incorrect.  Section 125(a) states that every trade agreement entered into 
by the U.S. must contain a provision allowing the U.S. to withdraw 
after giving appropriate notice.249  However, this sub-section is silent 
thdraw from trade 
agreements.250  he President may at any time 
terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation made under this 
emphasis added).251  Thus, pursuant to Section 125(b), 
President Trump may have the authority to unilaterally withdraw from 
certain NAFTA-related proclamations, but not from NAFTA as a 
whole. 
Importantly, a number of NAFTA provisions were implemented 
through presidential proclamation rather than explicit enumeration in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
(Implementation Act).252  For example, Section 201(a)(1)(A) of the 
Implementation Act enables the P modifications 
or continuation of 253 and Section 202(q) permits the 
President to proclaim certain matters respecting rules of origin.254  
Pursuant to, inter alia, the various sections of the Implementation Act 
authorizing NAFTA-
Clinton gave effect to various NAFTA provisions by issuing 
Proclamation 6641 on December 15, 1993
duty-related provisions.255 
President Trump, invoking Section 125(b) of The Trade Act of 
1974, may be able to unilaterally terminate Proclamation 6641 in part 
or in whole.256  However, it is unlikely that the President has such 
authority, particularly regarding a termination in whole.  Proclamation 
6641 was invoked in part pursuant to the Implementation Act, which 
                                                           
249 See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(a) (2016). 
250 See id. 
251 Id. § 2135(b). 
252 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 242, at 5-6. 
253 19 U.S.C. § 3331(a)(1)(A) (2016).  
254 19 U.S.C. § 3332(q) (2016); see also Johnson, supra note 242, at 5.
255 Johnson, supra note 242, at 6; see also Proclamation No. 6641, 58 
Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596 (Dec. 15, 1993). 
256 See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (2016). 
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specially provides for NAFTA-related tariff treatment.257  Notably, 
Section 125(b) only allows the President any 
proclamation made under this chapter
allows the President to terminate proclamations made pursuant to Title 
19, Chapter 12 of the U.S. Code.258  Therefore, Section 125(b) does 
not apply to the Implementation Act, which is found in 19 U.S.C. 
21.259  As a result, Section 125(b) cannot be used to terminate any parts 
of Proclamation 6641 made pursuant to the Implementation Act, an 
Act found in 19 U.S.C., Chapter 21 and not Chapter 12. 
Furthermore, Proclamation 6641 was made pursuant to a number 
of different U.S. Acts in addition to the Implementation Act, including 
Sections 201 and 203 of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 
(19 U.S.C. 8) and Sections 1102(a) and 1204 of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 18).260  As discussed 
above, Section 125(b) does not apply to either of these Acts because 
they are enumerated outside 19 U.S.C. 12.261  Therefore, Section 
125(b) cannot be used to terminate the parts of Proclamation 6641 that 
were made pursuant to Acts found in 19 U.S.C. Chapters 21, 18, and 
8, and not in Chapter 12.  
Conceivably, President Trump could invoke Section 125(b) to 
terminate the parts of Proclamation 6641 that were made pursuant to 
Sections 504 and 604 of The Trade Act of 1974, which are found in 19 
U.S.C. 2464(c) and 2483.262 However, this would be highly 
impractical as it would frustrate the administration of NAFTA, anger 
major confrontation with 
Congress 263  Additionally, such in part termination of Proclamation 
                                                           
257 See Proclamation No. 6641, 58 Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596, 2596-98 
(Dec. 15, 1993); see also Johnson, supra note 242, at 6. 
258 19 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (2016) (emphasis added). 
259 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 242, at 6.  
260 See Proclamation No. 6641, 58 Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596, 2598 (Dec. 
15, 1993); see also Johnson, supra note 242, at 6. 
261 See 19 U.S.C. § 2135(b) (2016). 
262 See Proclamation No. 6641, 58 Fed. Reg. 66867, 2596, 2598 (Dec. 
15, 1993); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c) (2016); see also 19 U.S.C. § 2483 
(2016). 
263 Johnson, supra note 242, at 6. 
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6641 would ultimately have an insignificant effect on NAFTA as a 
whole, especially regarding NAFTA-related tariff treatment. 
 
President 
instigating a resurgence of protectionist policies, is motived primarily 
by his exclusive focus on the bilateral merchandise account trade 
deficits that the U.S. runs with other countries.264  This exclusive focus 
makes little sense in an integrated globalized economy, putting the 
-economics logic is simply 
flawed, as he fails to take into account (1) the negative consequences 
that increased trade barriers can have on American companies that 
operate as part of international production chains and (2) the portion 
of foreign country exports consisting of American made component 
parts.265 
President Trump erroneously sees bilateral merchandise account 
deficits as the result of unfair foreign trade practices and not the result 
of systemic economic forces.266  According to Trump, these deficits 
are the primary cause of U.S. manufacturing job loss and economic 
disadvantage.267  As such, Trump also believes that reversing these 
trade deficits will re-open abandoned or transformed U.S. 
manufacturing facilities and create a substantial volume of jobs.268  In 
reality, trade deficits merely reflect a low savings rate relative to 
consumption and investment rates, and are a function of these rates 
more than of trade policy.269  Additionally, reversing trade deficits will 
likely have little to no effect on manufacturing-sector employment 
rates due to automation.270  Furthermore, despite what President 
                                                           
264 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 5. 
265 See id. at 5-7. 
266 See id. at 2. 
267 E.g., Don Lee, Why Trump's Obsession with Trade Deficits is 
Misguided, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
trade-deficit-trump-obsession-20170502-htmlstory.html.
268 Id.
269 Id.  
270 Id. 
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-
271 
The Trump administration should be focused more on the size and 
sustainability of global (i.e., not bilateral) current account balances, 
which depend more on domestic spending than on trade policies.272  
Nevertheless, the administration remains fixed on bilateral 
merchandise account deficits.273  As a result, it appears President 
Trump is primarily concerned with the trade practices of four countries 
in particular China, Germany, Japan, and Mexico because of the 
large goods account surpluses they run with the U.S. (see Figure 1 
below).274  However, as previously discussed, bilateral goods deficits 
are only one of the important factors used by the Department of the 
Treasury to identity unfair foreign trade practices.  Neither China nor 
Mexico have global current account surpluses in excess of 3 percent 
of their GDPs.  Additionally, none of these four countries is actively 
intervening to decrease the value of its currency.275 
Based on his trade-
chief concern is to bring jobs, especially manufacturing jobs, back to 
the U.S.  However, the U.S. economy is near full employment as the 
current unemployment rate has dropped to 4.4 percent, a 10-year 
low.276  
increases to infrastructure spending will increase domestic spending 
and demand for goods further exacerbating the current account deficit 
issue.277  
at 2.5% of GDP and is no longer as big of a concern as it once was (in 
                                                           
271 E.g., Peter S. Goodman, cit Obsession: 
Deficient Analysis, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/business/trump-xi-trade-deficit-
china.html?_r=0. 
272 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2. 
273 See id. 
274 See id.; see also, Lee, supra note 267 (explaining that trade deficits 
should not be the only benchmark for economic health). 
275 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 2. 
276 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2017) 
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000. 
277 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 3.  
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GDP).278  In the short-
279  In the long-
280  Many 
economists believe that advances in information and communication 
technology and automation and not trade practices abroad are the 
281  In fact, some have argued that as 
much as 88% of U.S. manufacturing job losses between 2000 and 2010 
were the result of advances in technology.282  These technological 
advances allow manufacturing companies to produce more output with 
less people (see Figure 2).283  
practices through unilateral trade action is based on irrational 
assumptions and will likely prove futile. 
Additionally, President Trump fails to properly consider the 
negative consequences that will affect U.S. companies as a result of 
his decision to increase trade barriers via unilateral action.  What 
Trump fails to see (or chooses to ignore) is that increasing tariffs or 
other non-tariff barriers to trade on foreign imports functionally 
imports consist of raw 284  This is a 
particularly salient issue for companies like Boeing, whose supply 
chains are extremely globally integrated (see Figure 3 below).285  
made up of raw materials, parts, and components originating in the 
                                                           
278 Id.; Current Account Balance (% of GDP), The World Bank: Data, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS?end=2016&lo
cat=&locations=US&start=1970&view=chart, (last visited Nov. 27, 2017). 
279 See Dadush, supra note 39, at 3.  
280 Id. 
281 E.g., id.; see also, Lee, supra note 267.  
282 See e.g., Michael J. Hicks and Srikant Devaraj, The Myth and Reality 
of Manufacturing in America, BALL S.U. (2017), 
http://conexus.cberdata.org/files/MfgReality.pdf. 
283 Ben Casselman, Manufacturing Jobs Are Never Coming Back, FIVE 
THIRTY-EIGHT (Mar. 18, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
manufacturing-jobs-are-never-coming-back/.
284 Dadush, supra note 39, at 2-3. 
285 Id.  
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United States.286  For example, it is estimated that about 40% of the 
value of goods imported from Mexico is made in the U.S. (i.e., that 40 
percent of imports from Mexico consist of parts and components 
produced by American companies in the U.S.).287  Similarly, various 
with the U.S. is overstated by as much as 50% due to the significant 
from component parts originally made in the U.S. and imported by 
China.288  As a result of these economic realities, it is clear that 
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